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IS THERE CONSUMPTION RISK 
SHARING IN THE EEC?
Angel J. Ubide*
Dept, of Economics, European University Institute 
Via dei Roccettini, 9




There is a debate about the degree of consumption risk shar­
ing existing in the EEC, and about whether the EEC should pro­
vide some specific insurance schemes. This paper introduces and 
develops theoretically the concept of international consumption 
risk sharing and presents some empirical evidence with respect to 
external and idiosyncratic variables in static and dynamic frame­
works. We find that, although there are substantial differences 
across countries, the level of risk sharing is quite high in the EEC 
and no further institutional agreements seem to be needed in order 
to implement first best allocations.
*1 would like to thank Fabio Canova, Mark Salmon, Morten Ravn, Robert Wald- 
mann, Alberto Giovannini and J.H. Lopez for very helpful comments and suggestions. 






















































































































































































The degree of international capital market integration achieved by capital 
flows remains a matter of debate after 20 years of the assumed interna­
tionalization of the world economies.
The importance of this issue is twofold. First of all, free capital 
mobility is in general a necessary condition for the efficient international 
allocation of world’s savings. In complete competitive markets, welfare 
enhancing trade will take place continuously over time in response to 
the arrival of new information and that will induce the allocation of 
savings to the investments with highest returns, and the prevention of 
arbitrages. That may imply the departure from the equality of savings 
and investments that must hold in a closed economy.
Second, free capital mobility is crucial as an insurance mechanism 
against unforeseeable shocks. On the financial side of the economy, free 
capital mobility allows agents to diversify their portfolio and hence to 
maximize returns while minimizing risks. Purely financial transactions 
account for a large share of the trade in capital markets but an important 
dimension of trade in these markets is represented by the net exchange 
of financial assets for current consumption. At a national level, this 
exchanges will be reflected in the net capital flows in the balance of 
payments. Besides, capital account transactions may contribute to the 
international sharing of consumption risks, since they permit individual 
countries to smooth their consumption over time by issuing claims to 
overcome transitory shortfalls in domestic output or transitory increases 
in domestic investment, serving as the insurance mechanisms in the real 
part of the economy. Therefore, an economy with perfect capital mobility 
where the consumption risk sharing proposition will be binding, implies 
that individual agents, countries at a national level, will not react in 
response to idiosyncratic shocks, and will react to common shocks only 
to the extent that reacts the aggregate.
This issue of international consumption risk sharing becomes more 
important as the degree of integration of the economies increases. In 




























































































by definition, as it is in open economies where each individual country 
is in principle able to offset the shock through suitable policy action. 
In more integrated economics this may no longer be true, since the de­
gree of policy independence may often decrease with integration. For 
example, in a fixed exchange rate agreement, monetary policy autonomy 
disappears and the scope for fiscal policy is also limited, at least in the 
medium term. Within a system such as the future European Monetary 
Union, if the market does not naturally provide it, some provision should 
appear in order to ensure the desired degree of consumption risk sharing 
and protect individual countries in difficulty since, as Sala-i-Martin and 
Sachs (1992) among others suggests, it may be critical for the successful 
implementation of a common currency.
Beyond this direct interest in the risk sharing proposition, the pres­
ence and strength of consumption insurance has methodological impli­
cations for macroeconomics and finance. Full consumption insurance 
implies the existence of a representative consumer, that is, a social wel­
fare function defined over aggregates that is independent of changes in 
the distribution of income or wealth over time. A rejection of insurance 
suggests that there may be important relations between distributions 
of income or consumption that should be accounted for by explicitely 
modelling the atomistic nature of the private sector.
Reflecting the importance of the issue of international capital mar­
ket integration, a huge body of literature has been developed in order 
to evaluate the degree of integration of the markets, applying the first 
two characteristics of integrated capital markets that we have examined 
above: the allocation of savings and investments and the comparison of 
rates of return and diversification of portfolios. Instead, the third char­
acteristic, the sharing of risks in consumption, has only be developed 
recently at a macro level, analyzing G7 countries U
Here we enter the debate of whether the EU has reached the de­
sired degree of market integration by analyzing the consumption risk 
sharing properties of the european space. We analyse the different ap­
proaches to the study of financial integration in Section II in order to




























































































provide a framework in which to encompass our study. We will use a 
very simple neoclassical model without capital to derive theoretically the 
international consumption risk sharing proposition, that is, the equaliza­
tion across countries of the marginal rates of substitution in consumption 
(Section III).
With the exception of Canova and Ravn(1993), the existing papers 
test risk sharing by computing correlation coefficients of consumption 
series typically without standard errors. This evidence is far from being 
conclusive, and in any case it can only be interpreted as contemporaneous 
evidence. Our empirical investigation in Section IV will try to go further 
and will have four parts. Given that risk sharing is widely investigated in 
International Real Business Cycle models, we provide correlation coeffi­
cients in order to compare with existing literature on international styl­
ized facts. Then, we investigate our theoretically developed conditions 
in two setups, one static through regression analysis and one dynamic 
through impulse response and variance decomposition analysis in VAR 
systems. This will permit us to test the intuition that lies behind the 
risk sharing proposition, that is common responses to common shocks 
and no responses to idiosyncratic shocks. We also provide informal mea­
sures of average risk sharing across Europe through SURE regression 
coefficients and the variance decomposition analysis. Finally, we allow 
for the posibility of lagged risk sharing testing for Granger-causality in 
the VARs.
There are some results standing out from our analysis. The first 
one is that the degree of risk sharing is high in the EU, around 60-70% on 
average, but with differences across countries. We can not draw such a 
clear picture as them, but our results are broadly in the line of the ‘core’ 
and ‘periphery’ of Bayoumi and Eichengreen(1991). Belgium, Luxem­
bourg and The Netherlands are the countries with highest degree of risk 
sharing and toghether with Germany, France and the UK could form the 
‘core’ of the Union. Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain are the coun­
tries with less amount of risk shared within the EU. The explanation 
may lie in the fact that Portugal, Greece and Spain have been relatively 




























































































Ireland is perhaps more conected with U.K. than with Europe. Finally, 
Denmark and Italy constitute a third category that exhibits rather pe­
culiar characteristics. Denmark appears to be an open country but that 
it is not sharing its risks within the EU and Italy displays such variablity 
that any analysis is spoiled due to the huge standard errors.
The main result of our analysis is that, given that our data includes 
nontradable goods, it seems from the evidence that the existing institu­
tions and arrangements are providing a good degree of risk sharing and 
that no other specific implementation is needed. Likewise, the degree of 
market integration existing in Europe seems sufficient and no substan­
tial welfare gains can be expected from the further opening of capital 
markets. However, policy measures seem to be needed to solve the struc­
tural divergences that we have found in the reactions of the different 
countries to the idiosyncratic variables. However, it should be stressed 
that this problem is to be solved through an institutional redesign and a 
redistribution of income and not through specific insurance programs.
2 HOW CAN WE MEASURE CAPITAL 
MOBILITY
Since the 1970’s, the world financial markets have clearly become global. 
Both the widespread financial deregulation and modern communication 
technologies have created close linkages among the financial markets of 
the industrialized countries.
Capital becomes mobile between two regions if some of their resi­
dents are able to engage in inter-regional asset trades. Thus, the degree 
of capital mobility is measured by the scope of such trades, which will in 
practice be limited by transaction costs, taxes and specific regulations.
It is important to stress that the degree of capital mobility can­
not be measured by total size of net capital flows, either in absolute 
value or relative to gross national products. Large capital flows can take 




























































































and investment can be perfectly allocated even without any capital flow. 
Dornbush (1980) defines perfect capital mobility as the combination of 
perfect substitution of domestic and foreign bonds and the instantaneous 
adjustment of actual and desired portfolios. However this definition only 
takes into account trade in safe nominal assets whereas considering the 
possibility of trading risky assets, Stulz(1986) defines that capital mobil­
ity as being perfect if, in all the states of the world, all investors value 
identically in some given numeraire any arbitrary cash flow irrespectively 
of where it originates.
There have been two main approaches in the literature to the issue 
of determining the mobility of international capitals.
The first one is based on the direct comparison of national saving 
and domestic investment rates based on the fact that in a closed economy, 
savings and investment must be equal. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 
initiated this approach based on the idea that the degree of correlation 
between saving and investment rates can serve as a barometer of the 
degree of capital mobility of an economy.
The second one, more indirect, derives from the equilibrium con­
dition that results from maximizing utility in simple neoclassical models 
and are based on the comparison of either expected returns on assets or 
marginal rates of substitution in consumption.
2.1 DIRECT MEASURES
The difference between a country’s income and its expenditure yields a 
direct measure of the extent to which it engages in intertemporal trade 
with the rest of the world. When an economy is closed, national income 
has to be equal to national spending. In contrast, open economies may 
finance discrepancies between income and spending through international 
borrowing and lending.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Horioka(1983) initiated this ap­
proach attempting to measure these discrepancies based on the assump­




























































































investments and movements in national savings will be approximately 
uncorrelated. Their analysis is based on regressing
(■I / Y ) i =  a  +  P ( S /Y ) i +  (i (1)
on a cross-section of OECD countries. They obtained a parameter 0 of
0. 887 and concluded that capital mobility is not perfect. This conslusion 
is based on the fact that the estimated value of 0 is interpreted as mea­
suring the effect of a sustained increase in a country’s savings rate on its 
investment rate, and therefore in a closed economy it should be equal to
1. However, recent research in the fields of endogenous growth and real 
business cycles has obtained similar values of this parameters in models 
with perfect capital mobility (see among many others Obstfeld(1992) or 
Baxter and Crucini(1993)) and therefore it is unclear that this direct 
relationship between savings, investments and capital mobility exists.
2.2 INDIRECT MEASURES
These attempts make use of the results of simple two-good models of 
international nominal interest rate differentials with risk averse investors, 
of the type developed by Breeden (1979) or Lucas (1978). If there is one 
asset in an economy with complete capital markets and representative 
agents, intertemporal maximization of the utility yields an equilibrium 
condition
EtlQlt+irt+i] = 1 (2)
where R is the return on the asset and Q the marginal rate of 
substutition of money, and it has to hold for every asset traded (j) and 
for every consumer (i).
2.2.1 Rates of return-based tests
Setting i fixed, a representative agent in Spain, for example, we may 




























































































comparing the yields on equivalent assets in different places.
The most straightforward approach would be the direct compari­
son of rates of return on physical capital in different countries. Although 
there have been some attempts (Harberger, 1978). the problems of mea­
surement or different tax treatment make it very difficult to compare 
it properly. Hence, most research has gone to a more restrictive group 
of homogeneous financial assets, and even here the different taxation of 
interest payments may include some biases in the results.
We should notice that if we make the comparison between assets 
traded in different currencies but in the same place (for example, Lon­
don Eurocurrency deposit rates) we test the forward foreign exchange 
premium instead of the degree of capital mobility. Hence, the relevant 
variables to use would be nominal yields on ’’ on-shore” and ’’ off-shore” 
assets denominated in the same currency. These rates generally do differ, 
quite expectably if you take into account cross-country heterogeneity as 
measured by default, sovereign and political risk, capital controls and 
other financial regulation. Frenkel(1993) reports tests for a wide range 
of industrialized and developing countries for the period 1982-1988, con­
cluding that in general short-term covered interest differentials were small 
and hence that there seems to be a substantial degree of capital mobility 
among OECD countries that has increased since the early 70s (see also 
Obstfeld, 1986b).
However, despite the fact that real world markets are assumed to 
be quite integrated, several studies have found that the portfolios of de­
veloped countries are biased towards domestic assets(e.g. Golub, 1991 
and Tesar and Warner, 1992), that there are predictable excess returns 
(Solnik, 1991a) and there is a vast room for diversification in the finan­
cial markets (e.g. French and Poterba (1991) or van Wincoop (1992)). 
The have been several explanations to that apparently irrational behav­
ior, that may include the existence of nontradable goods (Stockman and 
Dellas, 1989), the differences in relative risk aversion across countries 
(Canova and Ravn (1993)), the existence of frictions such that transac­
tion costs or taxes that may wipe out the benefits from diversification 




























































































formational costs about the future payoffs of international investments 
(Backus and Kehoe, 1992) or particular investor choices (French and 
Poterba, 1991). 2
2.2.2 Consumption-based tests
So far we have examined the existence of risk sharing using tests based 
on financial variables. But we can also fix j in equation 2 and set the 
test for the same asset for representative agents in different countries. 
This will lead us to consumption-based tests which examine countries 
participation in world financial markets.
This implies that the emphasis of risk diversification can be shifted 
from financial to real variables, and this brings us to the issue of inter­
national consumption risk sharing. Complete insurance implies that the 
consumption of agents will not vary in response to idiosyncratic shocks 
while risk diversification in financial markets implies that the value of 
a well diversified portfolio will not vary due to an idiosyncratic shock 
to a particular currency. Cochrane (1991) defines perfect risk sharing 
as the cross-sectional counterpart of the permanent income hypothesis, 
since the latter implies that the consumption of an individual will not 
vary over time in response to idiosyncratic transitory shocks.
You will find full consumption insurance if financial markets are 
complete or there are a set of institutions making the role of a central 
planner implementing Pareto optimal allocations. However, even when 
financial markets are not complete, Pareto optimal allocations can be 
obtained if there is continuous trading of a few long lived securities (Dufhe 
and Huang, 1985). Also, you could achieve close to full consumption 
insurance without complete markets or institutional intervention as long 
as agents have similar preferences and differ only on their income stream 
(Baxter and Crucini (1992) and Marcet and Singleton (1992)).
2 So far we have compared nominal interest rates. No much has been done about 
real interest rates, since the underlying theory is based on very strong assumptions 
which are very difficult to accept in practice: uncovered interest parity and purchasing 
power parity, which are always rejected in empirical tests (see, for example, Cuinby 




























































































Theoretical analysis of these issues appear in several kind of models 
and with different treatments. In models of closed economics with income 
heterogeneity across agents (Mace, 1991) or related to the issue of pre­
cautionary savings (Guiso and Jappeli (1992)). It arises also with open 
economies, where countries with heterogeneous income streams trade in­
ternationally in order to avoid country specific risks and only bear ag­
gregate world-wide risk (Brennan and Solnik (1989), Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland (1992) or Ravn(1993)). Finally, it arises also in endogenous 
growth models (Obstfeld (1992)).
Empirical analysis of international consumption risk sharing gen­
erally reaches the conclusion that markets for risk function imperfectly 
at the international level, and certainly less efficiently than they do at 
domestic or individual level. Atkeson and Bayoumi (1992), for exam­
ple, argue that the national diversification of regional incomes within the 
United States is significantly greater than the international diversification 
of European national incomes. Other examples along these lines could 
be Van Winkoop (1992), who examines the degree of risk sharing evi­
dent in Japanese regional consumption data or Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 
(1992) who present evidence on the amount of risk borne by the central 
institutions in the United States. This fact of imperfect risk sharing is 
specially true for less developed countries, where both institutions and 
markets are less developed and where the access to international capital 
markets is more problematic, implying lesser borrowing opportunities for 
reasons of moral hazard and country-specific risk.
With an international dimension, Canova and Ravn(1993), Obst- 
feld(1993) and Lewis (1993) have all studied the degree of risk sharing 
on samples of OECD countries, concluding that the level of risk sharing 
has increased since 1973 but is still less than perfect. The basic message 
of all these works is that correlations among international consumption 
movements axe too low to be fully explained with a model with free in­
ternational asset trade and complete markets, remaining, in the words of 
Backus,Kehoe and Kydland (1993), one of the most presssing puzzles of 
the international business cycle framework.




























































































proaches have tried to measure the welfare loses due to imperfect risk 
sharing (Breenan and Solnik (1989) and Obstfeld (1992)), analyse moral 
hazard issues as the reason of imperfect risk sharing (for example in less 
developed countries where there is credit rationing and risk of repudia­
tion (Atkeson (1991)) or in cases where insurance is directed to country 
specific shocks, say, moral hazard problems manifested in labor militancy 
when the cost of unemployment benefits is shifted from national to fed­
eral taxpayers (Eichengreen(1991))) or set up the conditions necessary 
for insurance schemes (differentiating between insurance and redistribu­
tion (Melitz and Vori (1992))) and institutions to implement the desired 
degree of risk sharing (Persson and Tabellini (1992)).
3 A simple theoretical model
Following an Arrow-Debreu approach we will cast the risk sharing prob­
lem in the setting of a world social planner. Since we have a model 
without distorsions, the outcome will be equivalent to the competitive 
equilibrium. The planner will maximize the weighted sum of expected 
utilities of the agents subject to an aggregate resource constraint. An 
optimal resource allocation will imply a distribution of aggregate endow­
ments that equalizes weighted marginal utilities across agents.
In particular, this world social planner faces the problem of max­
imizing the utility of the representative consumer of J countries when 
there is only one aggregate consumption good and perfect trade in a 
complete set of state-contingent assets.
The information structure of the economy is represented by sTt, r  =  
1 ,2...S, where each srt is an event that represents all common information 
at time t and collects all states of the world. S is finite, 7r(srt) is the 
probability that event r occurs at time t and ^(sTt) — l,V f.
The expected lifetime utility of the representative consumer in coun­
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t = 0  T = 1
where C3 (sTt) is the consumption of the agent of country j at time 
t and event r, 0< (3 <  1 is the discount factor common to all agents and 
bj (sTt) represents a preference shock, that may include all factors different 
from market consumption that can enter the agent’s utility function, like 
leisure, government expenditure, non tradables, household production 
and the like.
Each country is endowed with a stochastic amount of the good at 
each t, yi(srt)- The stochastic nature of the endowment can be repre­
sented as yt(sTt) =  Vt +  pi ( srt) +  €t(srt), where yj represents the deter­
ministic component, y3t (sTt) represent the effect of an aggregate shock 
and e3(srt) represents the idiosyncratic shock. Aggregating over the j 
countries, y“ (sr<) =  y1 +  p“ (sr<), since we assume that e“ (srt) =  0 for 
all events and points in time. The wealth of each country is represented 
by Ilj and the population by \j (we will assume that the population 
and wealth of the countries will not change with time) and Ilj =  
2 j= i Xj =  1-
Therefore, the world social planner will maximize the weighted sum 
of the expected utilities of the J countries, given by equation (4) by 
determining an allocation of consumption across countries subject to the 
aggregate resources constraint, equation (5):
J oo S
max ]T  Ilj J2 x{sTt)U[C3t (srt), bj(sr/)] (4)
q j=i t=o r=i
Y Xic * (s*t) =  Y XiVt (*r<) (5)
J - l  j= 1
for all events and dates, where 0< Ilj < 1 and C {(sTt) >  0 Vj. The first 
order conditions for that problem can be expressed as:
U'(C't (sTt)) 




























































































for any i and k, where U'(C\{sTt)) =  ■ Hence, the aggregate en­
dowment is distributed across countries such that the weighted marginal 
utilities are equated across countries.
Using logarithms, the above expression can be written as:
log U'(C't(sTt)) -  log U'(Ckt {sTt)) =  (7)
where £ik =  log ( ^ )  -  log ( ^ )  ,or alternatively
log U'(Ci(sTt)) -  log U'(C?(srt)) =  Ai (8)
where U'(C?(sTt)) =  1/j E /=1 U '(C}(srt)) and A, =  l o g ( ^ )  -  
l o g ( f ) .  Equation (7) implies that, apart from a scale factor, the 
marginal utility of consumption of any two countries must be equalized. 
Instead, equation (8) states that the marginal utility of consumption of 
country i is proportional to the marginal utility of average world con­
sumption, holding both propositions for all countries j, all states r and 
all periods t. It is important to note that while both implications are not 
different, the averaging procedure makes the second one be less stronger 
than the first and hence if equation (7) holds then equation (8) will hold 
as well but the reverse is not true.
For all those conditions to be valid, we should select a HARA utility 
function (see Breenan and Solnik(1989)). Among these we will choose 
a CRRA specification because (see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)) is 
compatible with balanced growth. Specifically, the utility function is
u [c i {8Tt)M (sr*)] = ( r z ^ : )  ( (c i (sTt)y(bi(srt))1- ^  if aj + 1  (9)
U[CJt (sTt),bi(sTt)] =  t] log C3t (sTt) +  (1 - r j )  log bi(sTt) otherwise (10)
where a} is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of country j and 




























































































With the above specification of the utility function, equations (7)
and (8) become
log Ci -  a ik log C* +  pa log 6,- -  pik log bk =  &*. (11)
and
log Ci -  a ia log Cf +  Pa log bi -  pia log ba =  At (12)
whereas =  and pik — .According to these cxpresions.
the consumption of country i net of taste shocks will be higher or lower 
than that of country k depending on the sign of Çik,which represents 
the differences of the logs of per capita wealth. Hence, countries with 
higher (lower) wealth per capita will consume more (less). And the same 
happens regarding the share of each country in aggregate consumption 
(equation (12)).
Taking the first difference of the equations, we may express the 
international consumption risk sharing proposition in terms of the rates 
of growth of consumption:
A  log C't =  a ikA  log C* — pa A  log +  pikA  log bk (13)
A logC ) =  a la A log C? -  A log bi +  piaA  log ba (14)
Since they are time invariant, the welfare weights are removed with 
the diffferences. The implications of these equations are that the rate of 
growth of consumption of country i net of preference shocks will comove 
with that of country k and with that of the aggregate. Hence, in a 
perfect risk sharing enviroment idiosyncratic shocks will not affect the 
consumption stream of individual countries and aggregate shocks will 
affect them only to the extent that the shocks affect the aggregate. An 
uneven response of a country to a common shock will be then evidence 




























































































We should note that we have made some important assumptions in 
our model. First of all, we have assumed representative agents in each 
country, and hence that there is already perfect risk sharing within each 
country. Second, our specification of the utility function assumes time 
and state separability. Third, we have assumed perfect information and 
complete asset markets. However, some of these problems have been 
already treated in the literature. Mace(1991) analyze the risk sharing 
conditions for exponential and power utility functions whereas Canova 
and Ravn (1993) extend it to issues like habit persistence, durability, 
more than one good traded, leisure or heterogeneous countries. Included 
in international real business cycle models, Ubide(1994) studies the impli­
cations of the risk sharing proposition when home production is included 
in the utility function of the agents, Deveraux, Gregory and Smith (1992) 
introduce leisure choices in a non-separable way and Tesar (1993) analyse 
the introduction of nontradable goods. In all the cases, the only differ­
ence will be that more elements will appear in the right hand side of 
equations 13 and 14, like elasticities of substitution (for nontraded goods 
or government spending) or leisure and productivity profiles (for leisure).
4 EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
This section describes the results of our empirical analysis.
The empirical investigation will follow four steps. The risk sharing 
issue has widely arosen in RBC models, since these models predict in gen­
eral a high degree of risk sharing, that means corr(C,C*)=l when C* is 
the consumption of the foreign country, whereas the coefficients obtained 
with actual data are substantially lower. Hence, in a first step we will 
compute cross-country correlation coefficients of consumption series in 
order to determine the degree of risk sharing in that sense. Newey-West 
consistent standard errors will inform us of the statistical significance of 
the point estimates.




























































































A log Cj =  /?i A log Cf +  02^  l°g  bt +  (15)
and in the case of perfect risk sharing the hypothesis H0 0i =  1 and 
02 =  0 should not be rejected. The predictions of these equations are 
that, regressing national consumption on aggreate consumption and any 
other right hand side variables that could affect national consumption, 
all variables other than aggregate consumption are predicted to enter 
insignificantly. This reflects that fluctuations in national consumption 
responds to aggregate risks but not to idiosyncratic risks. The right 
hand side variables will be both common and idiosyncratic variables.
All ther previous analysis are contemporaneous static implications 
of the risk sharing proposition. However, the intuition that lies behind 
the theory is in some sense dynamic, since we talk about the responses of 
national consumption to different shocks. We attempt to introduce this 
intertemporal dimension through the analysis of the impulse response 
functions in VAR systems of each national consumption toghether with 
common or idiosyncratic shocks. With this instrument we will be able to 
test the implications of equations (11) and (12), determining whether the 
response of domestic consumption to a common shock in two different 
countries are similar and whether the response of a country is similar to 
that of the aggregate. Likewise, we will study the response of national 
consumption to different idiosyncratic shocks and check, as predicted by 
the theory, that those responses are not significantly different from zero. 
Then, the variance decomposition analysis will inform us on the degree 
of risk sharing in this dynamic framework.
Finally, one further issue will be explored. The are countries that 
effectively share their risks within an aggregate but that systematically 
do so with some lag due to the particular structure of their economy 
(Spain, for example). The VAR setting allows us to test this implication 
through Granger-causality tests, since the prediction of the theory will 
be then that current and lagged exogenous variables should not help in 
predicting the behaviour of national consumption. Hence, we will test for 
Granger causality in the VARs, expecting that the exogenous variables




























































































will not Granger-cause national consumption.
4.1 Data analysis
The issues of capital markets integration and international consumption 
risk sharing has been to some extent developed and tested for the main 
OECD countries, but it has not been applied and tested for the European 
Community as a whole, despite the fact that it may become extremely 
important for the future implementation of a common currency at the 
third stage of the EMS. That has lead us to set up the tests with data from 
the twelve countries of the EET, in an attempt to discover the peculiarities 
of these groups of countries.
The data has been obtained from DATASTREAM, and measures 
annual per-capital total aggregate consumption data in 1985 prices from 
OECD Main Economic Indicators for the period 1960-1990 (see Data 
Appendix). The main difficulty we face when working with EU data is 
that quarterly data i sonly available for France, UK, Germany and Italy 
(in fact this is the reason why all the empirical tests of the theory have 
been done with G-7 data, since you can obtain quarterly data for all of 
them). But given the usually low quality of consumption data, it is more 
likely to find noise in quarterly than in annual data. Besides, Christodu- 
lakis et al. (1993) have analysed the stylized facts of the EU both annual 
and quarterly data and concluded that there is no significant difference 
between the two specifications. We should also note the impossibility 
of obtaining disaggregated series on consumption of tradables, a more 
convenient variable for our analysis than total consumption. But dif­
ferent dissagreggation methods across countries could have introduced 
distortions into the analysis. Hence, we offset the fact that the scries 
are short and include nontradables with supposedly a better quality and 
homogeneity of the data.
Consumption series are usually non stationary series. Our model 
has an implicit detrending procedure, since we will be working with the 
first difference of the series. It is important to note that different de­




























































































(1991)). First Order Differencing leaves in the data cycles of 2-3 years 
while, for example, Hodrick-Prescott filtering, leaves cycles of 5-6 years. 
This can be important when interpreting the results of our analysis be­




We start the analysis using the simplest tool that we have available, the 
correlation structure of the series. Unless otherwise stated, the standard 
errors are Newey-West consistent standard errors computed with 10 lags.
Table 1 displays the correlation matrix of the rates of growth of 
consumption for the twelve countries. The values range form zero (non 
significant) to 0.55. The mean values for the countries go from 0.19 
for Denmark to 0.44 for Belgium. Denmark is the country with less 
significant coefficients, (it is only significantly correlated with Luxem­
bourg), together with Portugal and Spain, that are only correlated with 
two and three countries respectively. Belgium, The Netherlands, The 
U.K., Ireland, France and Germany seem to be well correlated amongst 
themselves and Luxembourg remains in an intermediate position. Italy, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal seem to form another group as well.
Table 2 displays the correlation matrix of each country with a com­
posite variable called EU, constructed as a weighted average of the values 
of each country, using as weights the share in EU GNP of each country, 
and with the external shocks. This composite variable is significantly 
correlated with consumption in Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Greece and 
Spain. We have to be careful in interpreting these results, since the com­
posite variable is an average of the 12 countries of the EU. That means 
that the bigger countries are more likely to present higher correlations, 
and the countries with significant more variability will contribute deci­
sively to the variability of the composite variable, and that will be also 




























































































which shows a standard deviation of 0.083 whereas the rest of the coun­
tries show values around 0.02-0.03. That may imply that the significant 
correlations with the EU may only be really significant for our interpreta­
tion in the cases of Belgium and Netherlands, and perhaps in the case of 
Greece, since Italy and Spain are relatively large countries which display 
a high degree of variability.
4.2.2 Regression analysis
Recalling the theoretical implications of the international risk sharing 
proposition, we will estimate eq.(15). The aggregate consumption vari­
able will be the composite variable representing the rest of the EU for 
each country, that is, we exclude now the country from the composite EU 
in order not to overestimate the coefficient. The other right hand side 
variables will be: U.S. consumption. U.S. GNP, U.S. short term interest 
rates and oil prices as common external variables. For each country we 
will also consider population, rate of inflation, personal income (proxied 
by GNP per capita) and government consumption. Therefore, we will 
estimate for each country eight regressions, one for each right hand side 
variable, and we will test two hypotheses:
Ho : =  0 so no risk sharing occurs
H0 : Pi =  1 and d2 =  0, so that markets are completely integrated
But we have n observations over time in m equations for different 
cross section units. That implies that the residuals of this equations may 
be contemporaneously correlated across units. Therefore, using a SURE 
procedure seems the most adequate approach to use. The results appear 
in tables 3 and 4.
Regarding the case of common external variables, the hypothesis 
of /3i — 0 is only accepted for Denmark, Germany and Italy. Conversely, 
the hypothesis of /3i =  1 is only accepted for Italy, Greece, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. For the external variables, /?2 =  0 is only rejected for 
two countries, Denmark and U.K. Finally, the joint hypothesis is tested 




























































































are the only countries that accept the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing. 
However the interpretation of this results should be done carefully. Italy 
is by far the country with the highest variability in the series. This has 
the implication of higher standard errors and hence 0i is accepted to 
be both 0 and 1. Greece, Portugal and Spain have been traditionally 
countries with quite closed markets, and therefore it seems strange that 
these are the countries with more integrated markets. The explanation 
may be that the hypothesis of risk sharing could be accepted in the 
extreme case of autarky. Given that consumption depends on income, 
if two autarkic countries suffer from a common shock to income, their 
consumption streams will move relatively together even if the markets 
are closed. In that case, we could distinguish autarky form risk sharing 
by checking the relationship between national consumption and national 
income. If the latter is strong, the previous results could indicate a 
high degree of closeness of the economies. Finally, The Netherlands and 
Ireland seem to be the only countries with a high degree of risk sharing 
with respect to common external variables. The Irish case could also 
be tricky, since Ireland is a country that trades mainly with the U.K. 
The U.K. is a big country and has an important weight in the composite 
variable used in the regressions of Ireland. Therefore, it may be the case 
that Ireland is not sharing its risks within the EU but with the U.K. 
Denmark and Germany are the countries that seem not to share any risk 
at all within the EU. This is not necessarily a sign of closeness of the 
markets, it may imply the existence of trade relationships out of the EU, 
with Nordic or Eastern European countries, for example.
Regarding idiosyncratic variables, again Denmark and Germany are 
the only countries that accept the hypothesis /3\ — 0. Population enters 
significantly for Belgium. Portugal and France, inflation and government 
spending enter significantly in the equations of some countries but by far 
is personal income the variable that is more important across countries, 
being insignificant only for Denmark, Germany and the U.K. The F-test 
(tables 5 and 6) shows similar results as before regarding the countries: 
France, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and U.K. are the 




























































































the variables. Population, inflation and government spending seem to be 
well insured, but personal income is only insured by Netherlands. Hence, 
our previous hypothesis seems to be correct, since Greece, Portugal and 
Spain depend significantly on national income, confirming the intuition 
of closeness instead of openness. Italy, France, Netherlands and U.K. are 
the only countries that have shared idiosyncratic risks to some extent 
within the EU. Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg show some risk sharing 
which, however, is not perfect, and Germany and Denmark appear to be 
the countries that arc more independent of the EU.
If we estimate both systems under the restriction of equality of 
coefficients, we obtain the following parameter estimates
u s e USG USi P P PO P IN F IN C GOV
0.61 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.54 0.25 0.23 0.37
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
CNOo (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
These parameters may be interpreted as the ‘average risk sharing’ 
across Europe with respect to each of the variables. The average of these 
parameters, 0.48, could then be interpreted as the average fraction of risk 
that the members of the EU arc pooling inside the EU.
All empirical studies dealing with risk sharing have found an in­
crease in the degree of markets integration from 1973 onwards (see Ob- 
stfeld(1993), for example). This fact has been checked computing the 
previous correlations for the subsample 1973-1990. The second row of 
Table 2 shows the values of the correlation coefficient of each country’s 
consumption with the composite variable for the subsample 1973-1990, 
and we can see that now all the coefficients are significant, whereas for 
the whole sample only five countries were significantly correlated with 
the composite .
In order to determine the evolution of that increase in the correla­
tions we have computed recursive correlation coefficients of each country 
consumption with the aggregate, starting in 1972. Figure 1 displays the 
time value of this coefficients for the period 1972-1990. The main conclu­
sions that can be drawn from this picture is that there is a break in the 
behavior of the majority of the countries around 1972-76 that probably 




























































































countries and after this break, around 1980, the coefficients stabilize be­
ing more or less grouped at the end of the period.
A further confirmation of the latter fact is to check the variability of 
the series in the two subsamples. If risk sharing occurs more integrated 
markets should display less variability. The following table shows the 
percentage standard deviations of the series for the two subsamples, and 
in all the cases except for Denmark, Ireland and Portugal the the distance 
test reveals that the coefficient has decreased 3
B D F G I R I T G R L U N E P T S P U K
S . D .
s . e .
1.8
( 0 .1 )
3 .7
( 0 .2 )
2.4
( 0 .1 )
2.5
( 0 .1 )
3 .7
( 0 .2 )
8.3




( 0 .2 )
3.1
( 0 .3 )
4.1
( 0 .3 )
4 .4
( 0 .3 )
3 .0
( 0 .2 )
S . D .
s . e .
1.5
( 0 .1 )
3 .5
( 0 .2 )
2.1
( 0 .1 )
2.0
( 0 .1 )
3 .5
( 0 .2 )
3.6
( 0 .2 )
2.9
( 0 .1 )
2.3
( 0 .1 )
2 .2
( 0 .1 )
4.4
( 0 .3 )
3 .0
( 0 .3 )
2 .0
(0 .1 )
d.t. 3 .90 0 .51 4 .51 12 .5 0 .54 24 .5 2.01 2 .0 4 8 .1 2 0.05 1 0 .88 5 .5 5
Finally, if we now repeat the regression for the subsample 1973- 
1990, the F-test is accepted for many more countries (tables 5 and 
6).With respect to external variables, Germany in now the only coun­
try rejecting in all the cases the risk sharing hypothesis and countries 
like France or Belgium that rejected before now accept in all the cases. 
The same happens with respect to the idiosyncratic variables, and now 
even Germany accepts the risk sharing proposition for population and 
government spending. Hence, it seems that both the general opening of 
the markets and the process of integration in Europe has contributed to 
some extent to the pooling of consumption risks in the EU. However, we 
still find some differences across countries.
4.2.3 VAR  ANALYSIS
We have stated before that under full consumption risk sharing the re­
sponse to common external shocks should be the same across countries 
and the magnitude of the response broadly similar among the group of 
countries. If a country is hit by a common shock but not another we
3The first row are the values for the whole period 1960-1990. The second are the 
values for the subsample 1973-1990). The third row are the values of a distance test. 




























































































have a clear example of a situation in which risk has not been pooled. 
Thus, we could summarize the intuition that lies behind the risk sharing 
proposition as no response to idiosyncratic shocks and similar responses 
to common shocks. This intuition is in some sense dynamic, since we are 
talking of shocks today and its effect in the future, and therefore it seems 
that the static regression analysis may not be enough to fully test the 
risk sharing conditions of a group of countries. Hence, we will introduce 
these dynamics through the study of the responses of consumption in 
each country to common and idiosyncratic shocks.
The shocks are computed as the first differences of the scries. We 
have selected as shocks the same variables as before in order to compare 
the results.
The external shocks are: U.S. consumption, U.S. GNP, U.S. interest 
rate and oil prices. We have selected the U.S. because of its importance 
in the world economy. U.S. consumption will allow us to determine the 
degree of risk sharing and hence of capital mobility between Europe and 
the U.S. U.S.GNP and interest rate arc selected in order to introduce 
the effects of U.S. economic policies. Oil prices arc included because the 
European economies are still in general highly dependent on oil imports.
With a similar criteria, we have selected idiosyncratic shocks so as 
to cover different sources of shocks that may occur in the real economies: 
national population, inflation rate, government spending and GNP per 
capita. A better variable to be used for fiscal shock would have been 
government deficit, but we could not find sufficient good data to con­
struct it. Even the government spending series were not available for 
Luxembourg.
We will set two VAIts for each country, each containing national 
consumption and one of the vectors of shocks, S<c with the common 
shocks and S(‘ with the idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, we will estimate 
for each country and each vector of shocks




























































































where X< =  [A logC /,5*] and we will set L='2. We will compute 
the impulse response functions and check the following conditions: with 
respect to the common shocks, we will determine how is the response 
of the aggregate and then we will compare the responses of each coun­
try with the rest of the countries and with the aggregate, since we are 
expecting common responses to common shocks. With respect to id­
iosyncratic shocks, we will check whether the responses of each country 
arc significantly different from zero, since we are expecting no response 
to idiosyncratic shocks. In order to he able to say that a response is 
different from another one we need the standard errors of this impulse 
response, that arc computed with the method of Liitkepohl (1991).
Common external shocks Figures 2.3,4 and 5 show the orthogonal- 
ized responses over ten periods of each of the countries and the composite 
variable EU to the external shocks, and our goal will be double: we have 
two conditions, the first one that the responses of any pair of countries 
will be equal and second, less strong due to the averaging procedure, 
that the response of each country will be equal to the response of the 
composite variable.
The following panel summarizes the information contained in Figs.
2,3.4 and 5 analysing whether the individual responses are similar on the 
basis of its statistical significance/non significance and. when significant, 
on the sign and period (i.e. +3 means that the impulse response is 
significantly different from zero three periods ahead).
eu 6 d / 9 ir it 9r lu ne Pi ap uk |
use - 3 + 2 - 3 +2 +2 +2 +2 I
uag _ 2 - 2 +2 - 2 - 2
usi +4 - i - 2  +  3 +4 +4 _ 2 - 2
op - 3 +2 +2 +2 - 3 - 2
To the U.S. consumption we find negative responses in the third period 
for Belgium and Denmark and positive responses in the second period 
for Denmark, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and the U.K. To U.S. GXP 




























































































the second period while Italy reacts positively. Belgium. France, Greece 
and Spain display negative responses while EU, France, Ireland and Italy 
show positive responses to U.S. interest rates. Finally, EU, Denmark, 
Italy, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain have significant responses to oil 
prices.
In order to compare the responses of each of the countries with 
those of the aggregate, Figs. 6.7 and 8 show the two standard error 
bands of the impulse response of each country together with that of the 
EU to each of the shocks. In the case that the bands show no point in 
common at some time, we could establish that the responses are different 
at that time. The result is that only Denmark and Greece present this 
divergence, in the case of the impulse response to the oil price shock. It 
is also noticeworthy that the standard error bands of Italy are very wide, 
and hence the response may be very different.
This problem may be overcome with the study of the forecast error 
variance decomposition. This informs us on the percentage of variance 
of the forecast error of a given variable that is flue to each of the other 
variables. The percentage of the variance that is not explained by the 
shocks could be interpreted as the degree of risk sharing’ of each country 
in this dynamic framework. We can check that on table 7. where we have 
the variance decomposition of consumption in each country after ten 
periods. We can see that the percentage of variance not due to external 
shocks is similar across countries, around 60 %, while Portugal and France 
are the less affected countries, with 83 % and 78 % respectively.
Idiosyncratic shocks The first implication of the risk sharing proposi­
tion was that the response to a external shock should be equalized across 
countries. The second implication is that the response of each country to 
idiosyncratic shocks should be zero once we have taken into account the 
effect of this shock on the aggregate. Intuitively this occurs because if a 
country has diversified its risk it is hedged against any idiosyncratic shock 
not suffered by the group with which the pooling of risks occur. Hence, 
we test this second implication of the theory studying the response of 




























































































When we look at the impulse responses (Figs.9,10 and 11), sum­
marized in the following table,
eu b d / 9 ir it 9r lu ne pt sp uk
pop +3 +3
inf +2 - 2 +2 - 2 +2
inc - 3 - 2 - 3 - 2
gov +2 + 2 - 3 +3 +2
population shocks generate significant responses in consumption for 
Ireland, and Portugal, positive in the third. Inflation shocks generate sig­
nificant consumption responses for Denmark, Greece and U.K. (positive 
in the second period) and France and Netherlands (negative in the sec­
ond). Personal income shocks affects per capita consumption in Ireland 
and Greece in the second period and France and Italy in the third. Gov­
ernment affects also France, Ireland, Italy and Greece. Therefore we find 
that countries with different structures react differently and in different 
periods, but again significant responses are concentrated in the so-called 
'peripheral’ countries. The comparison of each country 2 s.e. band with 
that of the EU (Figs. 12,13 and 14) says that Denmark, France, Ire­
land, Greece and Portugal are the only countries that present responses 
different from the aggregate one.
The variance decomposition analysis confirms our results (Tab. 7). 
Around a 70 % of the variance is not explained by the shocks. Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal show the lowest values while Germany, Luxembourg 
and Spain show values greater than 80 %.
In summary, we can state that around a 60 % of the common shocks 
and a 70 % of the idiosyncratic shocks that affect the European economies 
are shared within the EU.
4.2.4 Granger-causality
As we have stated before, incorporating the lag structure of the VARs 
allows us to test whether past and present values of the external variables 
help in predicting the behaviour of consumption series and hence allow 




























































































clear, we expect that no idiosyncratic variable should help in predicting 
domestic consumption and that external variables should help only to 
the extent that they help to predict aggregate consumption. In table 
8 we present the results of Granger causality tests both on individual 
variables and on the block of exogenous variables.
Regarding external shocks, all the countries except France and Por­
tugal reject the block-noncausality hypothesis. In particular, Spain and 
Greece reject noncausality for all the variables, and it seems that this is a 
way to overcome the difficulty to distinguish between perfect risk sharing 
and autarky. Relatively closed countries will react to common external 
shocks with some lags, and hence the static regression analysis will clearly 
fail to reflect this feature. Portugal is still showing noncausality to exter­
nal variables but. given that even incorporating the lag structure it still 
react to idiosyncratic variables (see the second panel of table 8), we may 
conclude that Portugal is the closest country of the panel under study.
Regarding idiosyncratic shocks. France, Ireland and Greece seem to 
be the most affected whereas Luxembourg, Netherlands. Italy, Germany 
and Belgium are the countries that pass the test of block noncausality.
We can summarize our empirical results in the following points. 
First, there is a high degree of risk sharing among European countries, 
about a 60-70 % of the risks are shared within the EU. This is a quite high 
number if we take into account that we have included nontradables in 
the data, and hence sharing cannot be perfect. This sharing property has 
increased from 1973 and its stronger among the older members of the EU, 
what may imply that the European unification process has contributed 
to the diversification of risks.
However, we can identify two groups similar in some sense to the 
‘core’ and "periphery’ ° f Bayoumi and Eicheengrecn (1991)). The ‘core’ 
would be composed by the Benelux plus Germany, France and perhaps 
U.K. Then, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece would form the ‘periph­
ery’, a fact that is not surprising given the historical and economic char­
acteristics of these countries. We have seen that Portugal, Greece and 
Spain have an ‘autarkic’ behaviour and Ireland is perhaps more linked 




























































































ing an open country it does not show a high relationship with Europe, 
being perhaps the reason its close links with the Scandinavian countries. 
Finally, Italy should belong to the ‘core’ according to the different em­
pirical tests, but the huge volatility of its consumption series creates very 
big standard errors that may create misleading results. If we interpret 
high volatility as an indicator of closeness of a market, we could perfectly 
include it into the ‘periphery’.
Third, the exogenous variables that have the greater influence on 
the cyclical properties of the countries are US interest rates, oil prices 
and government spending. Oil prices is not a surprising result given the 
strong general dependence of the economies on oil products. US interest 
rates reveal the fact that during all these years the US have dominate the 
capital markets and in some sense determined some economic policy deci­
sions in European countries. We suspect that from the 80’s onwards this 
role has been played in Europe by Germany and that in order to repeat 
this analysis for the last 10 years it would more correct to use German 
interest rates. Finally, the fact that government spending has an impor­
tance in explaining cyclical fluctuations is explained by the dimension of 
public sectors in the European economies and the proliferation of public 
insurance schemes.
Our results are consistent with those of Canova and Ravn (1993), 
Obstfeld (1993) and Lewis(1993) in that they find substantial degrees of 
risk sharing, specially in Europe, increasing form 1973. We are also in 
the line of real business cycle theorists since we find that consumption 
correlations are significantly different from one (see, e.g. Ravn (1993)) 
and that government expenditure has a significant effect over the business 
cycle (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)).
5 CONCLUSIONS
Concluding, we have seen that, in a world of representative agents with 
open markets, international consumption risk sharing would be one of the 




























































































ical investigation has analyzed both static and dynamic implications of 
the theory with respect to a wide range of possible shocks that may affect 
the economics.
Regarding the results, we can say that there is a high degree of risk 
sharing within the EEC, increasing since 1973. but that it is far from 
being complete, not only due to market imperfections but also to the 
structural particularities of the different economies. These differences 
may also be related to national institutions and policy stances, and com­
mon institutions and policies should be directed to narrowing these gaps. 
Moreover, the most important exogenous variables seemed to be govern­
ment spending, oil prices and US interest rates. These findings may 
indicate how public policies can be reformulated in order to minimize 
the effect of these variables.
We have also found some distinction between the ‘core’ and the ‘pe­
riphery’ of the EEC that, in agreement with Bayoumi and Eichecngreen, 
suggest the EEC as a whole is not ready yet to form a common currency 
area, since there are still significant differences in the structure of the 
economies. Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, that exhibit important 
divergences with respect to the rest, and Italy, that shows a kind of ‘over­
shooting’ in the responses, may be the countries that would belong to 
that ‘periphery’ , and these were in fact among the countries that suffered 
most in the recent EMS crises.
However, given the fact that we have included nontradables in our 
series, the degree of risk sharing that exists now in Europe seems high 
enough, at least in the short term. This means that new institutions in­
tended to increase the efficiency of the markets in the line of Pcrsson and 
Tabellini(1992) may be irrelevant since no particular welfare gains could 
be expected from its implementation. Some institutionalized programs 
in order to help nations with structural problems may be welfare improv­
ing but, regarding the short term, the stabilizing role that can play the 
exchange rates could perfectly be played by wider and more automatic 
borrowing facilities for the governments that may need some help in case 
of a particular hard shock, and no specific insurance scheme seems to be 




























































































enough and that no significant welfare gain can be expected from further 
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Table 1: Correlation matrix of consumption series 1960-1990
D F G IR I T G R LU N E P T S P U K
B 0 .1 8 0 .5 0 0 .34 0 .5 9 0 .3 3 0 .4 9 0 .2 7 0 .4 7 0 .4 9 0 .3 2 0 .2 5
(0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .2 2 ) (0 .1 5 ) (0 .0 9 ) (0 .1 6 ) (0 .1 7 ) (0 .2 3 ) (0 .0 9 )
D 0 .2 5 0 .2 5 0 .1 3 -0 .1 2 0 .29 0 .1 3 0 .3 4 -0 .2 9 0 .0 1 0 .2 3
(0 .1 2 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .1 0 )
F 0 .2 4 0 .3 7 0 .2 4 0.41 0 .16 0 .1 8 0 .2 8 0 .1 3 0 .2 9
(0 .1 6 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .2 0 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .2 1 ) (0 .1 6 ) (0 .2 4 ) (0 .1 0 )
G 0 .4 2 0 .1 0 0 .36 0 .45 0 .6 9 -0 .0 4 -0 .0 4 0 .0 7
(0 .0 9 ) (0 .1 9 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 9 ) (0 .2 3 ) (0 .0 9 )
IR 0 .1 8 0 .30 0.11 0 .4 5 0 .21 0 .2 8 0 .2 9
(0 .1 4 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 9 ) (0 .1 6 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .0 8 )
I T 0 .55 0 .0 6 0 .4 5 0 .3 4 0 .5 0 0 .1 4
(0 .2 0 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .2 2 ) (0 .1 7 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .0 8 )
G R 0.01 0 .61 0 .01 0 .4 6 0 .1 4
(0 .0 6 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .1 8 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .0 9 )
LU 0 .3 1 0 .1 5 0 .1 9 0 .11
(0 .1 1 ) (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .0 6 )
N E -0 .0 2 0 .3 0 0 .1 7
(0 .1 8 ) (0 .2 2 ) (0 .0 9 )
P T 0 .1 3 0 .0 6
(0 .1 5 ) (0 .0 9 )
S P 0 .2 8
(0 .0 8 )
Table 2: Correlation matrix of consumption series with the aggregate
B D F G I R I T G R L U N E P T S P U K
0.51
(0 .3 0 )
0 .1 1
(0 .4 6 )
0 .51
(0 .3 6 )
0 .3 7
(0 .4 0 )
0 .4 5
(0 .4 2 )
0 .8 5
(0 .1 1 )
0 .6 8
(0 .1 7 )
0 .2 4
(0 .4 5 )
0 .6 4
(0 .2 3 )
0 .3 4
(0 .4 3 )
0 .6 2
(0 .2 8 )
0 .4 4
(0 .4 4 )
0 .74
(0 .0 7 )
0 .3 7
(0 .1 1 )
0 .63
(0 .0 6 )
0 .3 3
(0 .0 8 )
0 .6 0
(0 .0 6 )
0 .7 9
(0 .1 2 )
0 .3 8
(0 .0 9 )
0 .4 0
(0 .0 7 )
0 .6 8
(0 .1 3 )
0 .3 4
(0 .1 2 )
0 .7 2
(0 .1 6 )
0 .6 6
(0 .1 4 )
N o te :t h e  firs t  ro w  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  th e  w h o le  s a m p le  1 9 6 0 -1 9 9 0 . T h e  s e c o n d  ro w  t o  th e  s u b s a m p le  




























































































Table 3: Regression results
Country USC USG USi OILP
B 0.41 0.05 0.44 -0.02 0.90 -0.24 0.89 -0.14
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
3.08 0.37 3.10 -0.17 13.85 -5.29 11.39 -3.58
-4.43 -7.78 -4.01 -9.95 -1.52 -27.42 -1.45 -28.31
D -0.04 0.47 -0.02 0.24 0.33 0.86 0.41 0.44
(0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.28) (0.20) (0.22) (0.12)
-0.25 3.34 -0.13 1.79 1.17 4.31 1.85 3.80
-6.85 -3.76 -5.68 -5.75 -2.37 -0.72 -2.65 -4.77
F 0.33 0.18 0.36 0.05 0.70 -0.05 0.66 0.01
(0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.21) (0.10)
1.91 1.22 1.96 0.37 3.53 -0.41 3.15 0.14
-3.88 -5.46 -3.47 -7.57 -1.54 -8.46 -1.63 -10.03
G 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19
(0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
0.71 1.40 0.76 0.55 0.57 3.54 0.63 5.59
-4.69 -4.74 -4.17 -6.58 -9.33 -11.10 -14.28 -23.93
IT 0.59 0.22 0.45 0.35 1.29 0.19 1.07 0.48
(0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.21) (0.11)
3.32 1.34 2.43 2.63 7.56 1.58 5.04 4.30
-2.31 -4.73 -2.99 -4.79 1.71 -6.76 0.34 -4.68
IR 2.67 -0.02 2.19 0.45 2.00 -0.49 1.96 -0.31
(2.06) (1.10) (2.04) (0.86) (0.62) (0.33) (0.71) (0.28)
1.30 -0.02 1.08 0.52 3.21 -1.48 2.77 -1.13
0.81 -0.92 0.59 -0.64 1.60 -4.50 1.36 -4.71
GR 0.86 0.19 0.82 0.18 0.37 0.47 0.36 0.34
(0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16) (0.20) (0.10)
4.49 1.11 4.03 1.23 1.65 2.95 1.79 3.22
-0.71 -4.63 -0.89 -5.65 -2.79 -3.39 -3.21 -6.35
LU 0.31 -0.07 0.33 -0.07 0.72 -0.07 0.72 -0.05
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07)
2.38 -0.58 2.41 -0.68 5.58 -0.81 5.78 -0.69
-5.17 -8.67 -4.85 -10.54 -2.18 -11.71 -2.30 -15.90
NE 0.79 0.03 0.81 -0.01 0.75 0.26 0.75 0.17
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.17) (0.29) (0.20) (0.28) (0.14)
3.56 0.17 3.44 -0.07 2.54 1.26 2.70 1.24
-0.96 -4.85 -0.83 -6.07 -0.86 -3.69 -0.92 -5.84
PT 0.54 -0.11 0.63 -0.20 1.09 -0.78 1.00 -0.43
(0.29) (0.27) (0.31) (0.22) (0.72) (0.50) (0.68) (0.35)
1.88 -0.43 2.05 -0.91 1.52 -1.57 1.49 -1.22
-1.59 -4.20 -1.20 -5.40 0.12 -3.58 0.01 -4.07
SP 1.12 -0.33 0.88 0.15 1.14 0.09 1.16 0.03
(0.22) (0.18) (0.23) (0.15) (0.43) (0.26) (0.43) (0.20)
5.04 -1.80 3.83 0.99 2.68 0.36 2.69 0.17
0.54 -7.23 -0.53 -5.69 0.34 -3.44 0.38 -4.85
UK 0.23 0.31 0.19 0.22 0.79 0.41 0.79 0.24
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.28) (0.16) (0.34) (0.15)
1.93 2.98 1.44 2.47 2.78 2.47 2.34 1.64
-6.34 -6.62 -6.02 -8.52 -0.74 -3.60 -0.61 -5.17
Note:The first row is the parameter estimate, the second is the standard error, the 




























































































Table 4: Regression results
Country POP INF INC GOV
B 0.71 -2.70 0.42 -0.15 0.29 0.30 0.37 0.16
(0.16) (1.35) (0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
4.38 -2.00 2.90 -1.25 3.25 4.64 3.38 2.67
-1.75 -2.74 -4.05 -9.58 -8.06 -11.08 -5.74 -13.63
D 0.61 -4.72 0.16 -0.04 -0.17 0.68 0.45 -0.26
(0.35) (2.52) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.26) (0.14)
1.75 -1.87 0.98 -0.34 -1.54 7.60 1.71 -1.89
-1.11 -2.27 -5.30 -8.04 -10.50 -3.50 -2.11 -9.14
F 0.31 3.96 0.48 -0.10 0.25 0.41 0.56 -0.06
(0.09) (0.89) (0.17) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.16) (0.08)
3.53 4.44 2.82 -0.95 3.31 7.42 3.42 -0.74
-7.68 3.32 -3.10 -10.39 -9.92 -10.61 -2.65 -13.20
G 0.43 -0.95 0.25 -0.36 0.02 0.41 0.19 0.16
(0.24) (1.06) (0.23) (0.26) (0.15) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07)
1.79 -0.89 1.09 -1.35 0.11 4.23 1.50 2.34
-2.41 -1.84 -3.28 -5.15 -6.45 -5.98 -6.32 -12.52
IR 2.88 0.90 3.26 0.27 2.86 -0.11 2.91 -0.15
(0.31) (1.11) (0.43) (0.19) (0.30) (0.16) (0.34) (0.12)
9.33 0.81 7.58 1.42 9.63 -0.69 8.46 -1.25
6.10 -0.09 5.26 -3.93 6.26 -6.91 5.55 -9.49
IT 1.67 -1.12 1.25 -0.16 1.37 0.09 1.43 0.08
(0.21) (1.37) (0.35) (0.10) (0.34) (0.09) (0.34) (0.07)
7.84 -0.81 3.59 -1.66 4.05 1.03 4.20 1.19
3.15 -1.54 0.73 -12.13 1.10 -10.30 1.26 -13.89
GR 0.88 -0.50 0.34 -0.23 0.64 0.17 0.85 0.08
(0.20) (1.06) (0.14) (0.04) (0.18) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07)
4.46 -0.47 2.50 -5.27 3.57 2.58 5.24 1.17
-0.59 -1.42 -4.87 -28.42 -2.04 -12.25 -0.92 -13.24
r~Lu 0.25 0.31 0.15 -0.20 0.33 -0.11 0.00 0.00
(0.13) (0.26) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.05) 0.00 0.00
1.90 1.20 1.24 -1.96 2.37 -1.96 0.00 0.00
-5.62 -2.65 -7.01 -11.65 -4.91 20.32 0.00 0.00
NE 0.84 -0.34 0.82 0.16 0.45 0.45 0.52 0.30
(0.31) (2.29) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (0.08)
2.72 -0.15 4.85 1.11 2.20 2.97 3.77 3.90
-0.51 -0.58 -1.08 -6.03 -2.74 -3.64 -3.51 -9.09
PT 0.70 -0.86 0.10 -0.29 0.40 0.46 0.64 0.28
(0.24) (0.39) (0.40) (0.13) (0.19) (0.08) (0.28) (0.11)
2.89 -2.18 0.26 -2.23 2.13 5.82 2.29 2.60
-1.26 -4.71 -2.27 -9.91 -3.20 6.85 -1.31 -6.85
SP 0.86 -2.29 0.56 -0.23 0.56 0.19 0.68 0.07
(0.24) (1.51) (0.13) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) (0.24) (0.10)
3.63 -1.51 4.27 -3.79 3.10 2.55 2.87 0.73
-0.61 -2.17 -3.38 -20.60 -2.40 -10.62 -1.34 -9.21
UK 0.44 -1.65 0.12 -0.22 0.22 0.19 0.37 -0.04
(0.16) (1.48) (0.17) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.13) (0.05)
2.77 -1.11 0.72 -2.84 1.50 2.55 2.90 -0.86
-3.47 -1.79 -5.09 -15.80 -5.30 10.74 -5.04 -20.67
NoterThe first row is the parameter estimate, the second is the standard error, the 




























































































Table 5: F-tests results for external variables.
1960-1990 1972-1990
use USG USi Oil P use USG USi Oil P
B 10.39 10.29 11.71 11.25 1.73* 1.12* 0.53* 1.58*
D 8.95 6.92 6.61 11.01 6.94 2.86* 2.09 * 6.09
F 5.73 5.01 4.97 4.95 0.52* 0.63* 0.78* 0.51*
G 8.16 7.19 7.05 7.03 8.13 8.29 6.11 6.12
IR 1.14* 2.26* 7.02 0.76* 0.59* 3.06* 6.53 0.44*
IT 1.24* 1.72* 1.94* 1.26* 2.65* 2.06* 3.89 2.09*
GR 0.55* 0.67* 0.08* 0.53* 3.48 3.21* 0.59* 1.17*
LU 4.98 5.00 4.91 5.18 1.16* 1.13* 1.10* 1.27*
NE 0.48* 0.47* 0.66* 0.47* 1.82* 1.56* 1.08* 0.60*
PT 1.27* 1.53* 1.55* 1.20* 3.24* 1.81* 0.73* 0.35*
SP 0.57* 0.17* 0.01* 0.05* 0.81* 0.66* 0.91* 0.56*
UK 4.88 4.53 3.76 5.72 1.71* 1.08* 0.02* 2.39*





























































































Table 6: F-tests results for idiosyncratic variables.
1960-1990 1972-1990
POP INF INC GOV POP INF INC GOV
B 11.73 9.67 17.99 12.72 1.84* 2.98* 6.30 5.83
D 7.51 4.94 13.98 6.72 1.87* 1.41* 5.39 5.05
F 4.68 3.11* 7.93 3.04* 5.13 0.71* 1.17* 2.92*
G 5.48 6.49 11.74 6.22 2.82* 4.61 6.42 2.84*
IR 13.74 14.82 13.58 14.79 8.06 4.56 15.53 3.94
IT 1.06* 1.69* 1.21* 1.41* 0.64* 1.40* 0.74* 2.07*
GR 0.18* 2.53* 1.78* 0.46* 0.16* 2.40* 1.94* 0.33*
LU 4.99 5.20 5.58 1.71* 1.81* 5.48
NE 0.39* 0.76* 3.44 2.98* 0.27* 2.11* 0.66* 2.26*
PT 2.06* 3.29* 10.48 3.79 2.69* 7.36 18.02 5.91
SP 1.87* 3.15* 2.73* 0.90* 1.49* 6.66 3.45 0.63*
UK 3.26* 4.96 4.26 3.16* 0.05* 2.27* 0.54* 0.37*





























































































Table 7: Variance Decomposition
use USG USi OP POP INF INC GOV
EU 0.58 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.71 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.13
B 0.57 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.76 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.03
D 0.52 0.26 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.74 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.03
F 0.78 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.59 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.07
G 0.68 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.83 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02
IR 0.63 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.30 0.19 0.09 0.16 0.27
IT 0.53 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.67 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.05
GR 0.62 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.58 0.03 0.04 0.23 0.12
LU 0.61 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.89 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00
NE 0.58 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.71 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.08
PT 0.83 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.66 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.13
SP 0.45 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
UK 0.62 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.71 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.08
Note: The values indicate the percentage of variance after 10 periods that is explained 
by each variable. The first and sixth column indicate the percentage of variance not 




























































































Table 8: GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST.
use USG USi OILP Block
EU 0.43 4.04 1.12 2.65 18.66
B 5.63 10.07 3.77 0.89 18.08
D 7.65 3.04 6.59 10.49 28.10
F 1.35 4.60 7.38 1.28 10.88
G 13.96 8.81 2.88 0.01 20.72
IR 5.87 0.84 2.84 1.12 27.74
IT 6.47 7.57 1.02 2.93 44.58
GR 7.27 8.07 16.25 7.50 22.41
LU 1.99 3.17 6.78 8.04 18.50
NE 8.95 3.83 0.08 4.90 23.99
PT 2.72 3.59 0.55 2.53 9.32
SP 14.55 10.58 8.58 8.71 37.51
UK 4.65 4.27 1.03 3.67 18.66
POP INF INC GOV Block
EU 1.99 1.98 1.84 4.94 9.50
B 0.34 1.57 6.12 0.65 12.25
D 0.12 7.57 1.90 2.09 16.67
F 12.61 23.19 9.10 4.08 39.89
G 1.85 3.45 2.94 0.51 7.81
IR 20.08 4.59 53.98 33.02 90.47
IT 6.25 5.21 5.08 4.75 10.44
GR 4.27 27.57 35.32 6.48 19.41
LU 0.92 1.14 1.28 0.00 6.62
NE 3.78 6.94 0.26 3.64 13.37
PT 5.81 4.24 3.21 2.14 18.15
SP 0.20 1.11 0.04 0.07 1.36
UK 0.37 3.16 2.08 4.33 16.86





























































































Figure 1: Recursive correlation coefficents
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